Ovgun Ses (University of Essex, UK), Rachele Mazzini (University of Copenhagen, Denmark), Sebastian Wnęk (SWPS University, Poland)

Theoretical Background

Romantic relationships are marked by high interdependence: partners’ thoughts, emotions, and behaviors are deeply connected (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange & Balliet, 2015). Consequently, emotions are not only individually experienced but also shared and shaped through interaction (Schoebi, 2008; Sels, 2016). The Interpersonal Emotion Regulation (IER) framework captures this process, highlighting that people regulate not only their own emotions through social interaction (e.g., venting, seeking support) but also have their emotions regulated by others through strategies such as showing empathy, offering comfort, or providing practical assistance (Zaki & Williams, 2013). Not all regulatory efforts take the form of direct honesty: sometimes, individuals tell lies to protect or benefit their partner, known as prosocial lies (Levine & Lupoli, 2022). While honesty is generally valued and important for well-functioning romantic relationships (Reinhardt & Reinhard, 2023; Roggensack & Sillars, 2014), people may prefer deception if it is perceived as benevolently motivated and if the withheld truth would cause emotional harm (Guthrie & Kunkel, 2013; Levine & Lupoli, 2022)..Despite their prevalence, it remains unclear whether such lies achieve their intended effect for the receiving partner.

When receivers interpret prosocial lies as benevolent, they tend to judge them more favorably, consider them ethical, and develop greater benevolence-based trust, as the lie signals the partner’s good intentions (Levine, 2021; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). Prosocial lies may be especially consequential in romantic relationships where one partner has a chronic illness. Chronic illness often entails ongoing physical symptoms, functional uncertainty, pain, and disruptions to daily life, all of which contribute to persistent stress (Heijman et al., 2023). In such contexts, stress is not experienced in isolation, as partners are intimately involved in daily coping and illness management (Acitelli & Badr, 2005; Bodenmann, 1997). How a partner communicates—whether through blunt honesty or a prosocial lie—can meaningfully shape the receiver’s emotional experience. For example, a blunt remark about one’s appearance may heighten stress, whereas an optimistic reassurance, even if slightly exaggerated, can provide comfort when perceived as a caring attempt to ease worry. Thus, prosocial lies interpreted as benevolent may function as a form of IER , helping to reduce stress for people living with chronic illness (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). Despite their relevance, prosocial lies have rarely been examined as a form of IER , particularly in the emotionally demanding context of chronic illness. Most research has focused on the motives of the person telling the lie (Lupoli et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2016) or on evaluations of the lie itself (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; Lupoli et al., 2018), rather than on the experiences of the receiving partner. Yet, for people coping with chronic illness, how they interpret and respond to a partner’s communication may have important consequences for well-being.

The Present Research

This study investigates the role of prosocial lying as a form of interpersonal emotion regulation in romantic relationships affected by chronic illness. We extend the existing IER framework—which predominantly focuses on honest and supportive behaviors—by introducing prosocial deception as a regulatory strategy with potential to affect partners' emotional experiences. Although prosocial lies are relatively common in close relationships (Levine & Lupoli, 2021), they have not been systematically conceptualized or examined as interpersonal regulatory strategies, representing a significant gap in the literature.
We situate these processes within the context of chronic illness, a high-stakes and underexplored relational environment in which partners are frequently required to manage each other’s emotional wellbeing (DeVellis et al., 2003). This context is particularly relevant, as emotional regulation in such relationships may carry significant implications for both psychological functioning and relational outcomes. By integrating perspectives from emotion regulation, prosocial behavior, and interpersonal processes, the present research bridges key domains within social psychology and extends IER theory to include morally ambiguous, yet potentially beneficial, forms of behavior. We propose that prosocial deception, despite its moral ambiguity, may serve an adaptive interpersonal function by enhancing perceived partner benevolence, which in turn may increase relationship satisfaction and reduce perceived stress, particularly when compared to unpleasant but honest communication.

Methods and activities undertaken

With the support provided by the EASP Seedcorn Grant, we conducted one pilot study and two main studies. We recruited individuals aged 18 or older who self-identified as having chronic pain and were in a committed relationship for more than four months. In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions in which they read a scenario depicting a stressful situation outside the context of chronic illness (i.e., a job interview). In this scenario, a romantic partner responded with either a prosocial lie or a harsh truth. Participants then reported perceived partner benevolence, relationship satisfaction, and their anticipated levels of stress, and pain following the interaction. This initial study allowed us to establish baseline effects of different communication strategies in a general stress context.
Subsequently, to enhance ecological validity, three scenarios tailored to the context of chronic illness were developed and evaluated by participants with chronic pain in a pilot study, to ensure they were closely aligned with the lived experiences of this population. The pilot study assessed perceived realism, manipulation effectiveness—specifically whether prosocial lying was correctly identified as deceptive—and how each communication type was perceived in terms of supportiveness, positivity, and attributed partner intentions. Importantly, to disentangle the effects of deception from those of message positivity, we introduced a kind truth condition. This allowed us to examine whether supportive outcomes depend primarily on positivity (regardless of truthfulness) or whether prosocial lies function as a distinct interpersonal regulation strategy.
In Study 2, the scenario demonstrating the strongest pilot performance (i.e., attending a friend’s party) was selected. The study sought to replicate and extend the findings of the first study while incorporating the kind truth condition, with measures closely mirroring those used previously.

Empirical research and findings

Across the two studies, prosocial lies consistently emerged as protective for individual and relationship wellbeing. In the first study, participants anticipated less stress and reported greater relationship satisfaction when their partner told a prosocial lie rather than a harsh truth, an effect driven by higher perceived partner benevolence. The pilot study then informed a more ecologically valid scenario for the second study, in which participants imagined their partner responding to a chronic illness-related dilemma before attending a social event. An example of the prosocial lie condition is presented below:
“You and your partner are invited to your partner’s best friend’s party. You have been experiencing a difficult pain flare-up and have felt very fatigued all day. Because of this, you are worried that you may not be able to stay at the party for very long. Your partner would prefer to stay longer and feels disappointed about the idea of leaving early. When you tell your partner how you feel, your partner responds: "I don’t mind leaving early at all. I’m happy to spend whatever time we can together."
In Study 2 participants who received a prosocial lie reported lower anticipated stress than those in both the harsh truth and kind truth conditions. Relationship satisfaction, however, did not significantly differ between the prosocial lie and kind truth conditions, with both exceeding the harsh truth condition. Consistent with Study 1, perceived partner benevolence emerged as a key explanatory mechanism across outcomes. It fully mediated the stress-buffering advantage of prosocial lies over kind truths, and significantly mediated the relationship satisfaction pathway — suggesting that even when the truth is delivered kindly, a lying partner is perceived as more caring and well-intentioned, and it is this perception of greater benevolence that underlies both the stress and relationship satisfaction advantages of prosocial lies.
In exploratory analyses, we also observed that prosocial lies were related to anticipated pain. In Study 1, prosocial lies were associated with lower anticipated pain than harsh truths. In Study 2, both prosocial lies and kind truths were associated with lower anticipated pain than harsh truths. These associations were mediated by perceived partner benevolence. This pattern suggests that the truthfulness of a partner’s response may be less important than its perceived intent: even deceptive responses can reduce anticipated pain when they are protective, as they enhance perceptions of partner care and good intentions, underscoring that partner communication in the context of chronic illness can shape not only stress but the anticipation of physical pain as well.

Contribution to wider research activities of future research

Across two studies, we found that prosocial lies were consistently associated with more favourable individual and relational outcomes than harsh truths, with perceived partner benevolence emerging as a key mechanism. These findings suggest that, in close relationships, the perceived intent behind a partner’s response may be more important than its truthfulness, highlighting how even deceptive but protective communication can regulate emotional and pain-related experiences.
This study addresses a core issue in social psychology: how people influence and regulate one another's emotions in close relationships. First, it introduces prosocial lying as a potential form of IER, expanding current models that have primarily focused on honest, supportive behaviors. Second, the project situates these behaviors within the context of chronic illness, a high-stakes and underexplored setting in which partners are routinely faced with the challenge of managing each other's emotional wellbeing (DeVellis et al., 2003). Third, it integrates perspectives from emotion regulation, prosocial behavior, and interpersonal processes, thereby bridging important areas of social psychology. Finally, a tangible methodological contribution of this project is the development and piloting of an ecologically valid scenario designed specifically to study prosocial lying in the context of chronic illness, offering a ready-to-use tool for future research in this area. Together, these contributions extend the IER framework and highlight the broader relevance of prosocial deception for research on communication, trust, and relationship wellbeing.

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