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EASP – European Association of Social Psychology

Meta-Analysis: Seeking studies/datasets on coalition formation

01.03.2024, by Shaul Shalvi

Please email h.rabinovitch@uva.nl

We are conducting a meta-analysis assessing how people form coalitions in a simple weighted majority game (Komorita, 1984).

Coalition formation is defined as ‘the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving more than two units’ (Gamson, 1964, p.85).
If you have a study (published or unpublished) that fulfils the inclusion criteria below, please inform us via an email to:

h.rabinovitch@uva.nl

We are interested in any study or dataset with experimental data that studies coalition formation. If you have any questions/doubts, please don’t hesitate to write to us.
Looking forward to reading your work!

Inclusion criteria:
1. Participants are assigned to groups of 3 or more;

2. Each participant in a group is endowed with some resources (hypothetical or converted to real payoff);

3. For a coalition to be formed, the coalition must possess a certain amount of resources (or votes), which cannot be achieved by a single player;

4. The formed coalition specifies how the gained resources would be distributed between the coalition members;

5. The coalition members and/or distribution of payoffs can be suggested by the players or by an exogenous agent;

6. The task can be either non-contextualized or contextualized (e.g., power struggle: Cole et al., 1995; landowners: van Beest et al., 2003;

7. Collations can be agreed upon via various protocols (e.g., one step protocol, Komotita & Meek, 1978; tentative coalition protocol, van Beest et al., 2008);

If your study fits with our criteria, please send us your paper/data so that we can include it.

Selected studies fitting the above criteria:

Vinacke, W. E., & Arkoff, A. (1957). An experimental study of coalitions in the triad. American Sociological Review, 22(4), 406-414.

Cole, S. G., Nail, P. R., & Pugh, M. (1995). Coalition preference as a function of expected values in a tetradic weighted-majority game. Basic and applied social psychology, 16(1-2), 109-120.

Van Beest, I., Wilke, H., & Van Dijk, E. (2003). The excluded player in coalition formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(2), 237-247.

Wissink, J., van Beest, I., Pronk, T., & van de Ven, N. (2022). The Online Coalition Game: A tool for online interactive coalition formation research. Behavior Research Methods, 54(3), 1078-1091.

Hagai Rabinovitch Ph.D. | Postdoctoral Researcher | Faculty of Economics and Business | University of Amsterdam | Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam

E7.30 | T. +31 (0)6 39360237 | E: h.rabinovitch@uva.nl